Suspension-to-Suspension Justification Principles by Murphy, Peter
Forthcoming in Belgrade Philosophical Annual                                       Page 1 of 30
 
   
 1 
SUSPENSION-TO-SUSPENSION JUSTIFICATION PRINCIPLES 
PETER MURPHY 
UNIVERSITY OF INDIANAPOLIS 
murphyp@uindy.edu 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We will be in a better position to evaluate some important skeptical theses if we first 
investigate two questions about justified suspended judgment. One question is this: 
when, if ever, does one justified suspension confer justification on another suspension? 
And the other is this: what is the structure of justified suspension? The goal of this 
essay is to make headway at answering these questions. After surveying the four main 
views about the non-normative nature of suspended judgment and offering a taxonomy 
of the epistemic principles that might govern which suspended judgments are justified, 
I will isolate five important principles that might govern which suspended judgments 
are justified. I will call these suspension-to-suspension principles. I will then evaluate these 
principles by the lights of each of the four views about what suspensions are. I close 
by drawing some conclusions about the prospects for skepticism, the structure of 
justified suspended judgment, and the importance of theorizing about justified 
suspended judgment.   
 
While sophisticated theories of justified belief have proliferated, especially in the recent 
history of western epistemology, the same is not true for theories of justified suspended 
judgments (hereafter “suspensions”). This is unfortunate since it may mean that that 
we are not yet in a strong position to fully understand and evaluate various skeptical 
theses. The skeptical theses I have in mind are those that say that suspension is the 
only stance we are justified in taking to the claims in some domain. Fortunately, times 
are changing. Epistemologists have recently started to study suspension much more 
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closely than they have before.1 This paper adds to this new trend by offering some new 
arguments that bear on the nature of justified suspension, and consequently on 
skepticism’s prospects. 
My focus will be on two questions that any adequate theory of justified 
suspension must answer. First, when, if ever, does one justified suspension confer 
justification on another suspension? And second, how do clusters of justified 
suspensions hang together? Possible answers to these questions consist in epistemic 
principles that might govern justified suspensions.2 After providing a taxonomy of the 
kinds of principles that might govern the realm of justified suspensions, I will argue 
that some of the key principles that might govern when one justified suspension 
confers justification on another suspension and some of the key principles that might 
govern how justified suspensions hang together should be rejected. I will then look at 
what these negative findings mean for the skeptic’s prospects, the structure of justified 
suspension, and the importance of theorizing about justified suspension. 
The paper has five main sections. Since the non-normative nature of suspension 
is an important determinant of the justification norms that govern suspensions, and 
since the non-normative nature of suspension is a matter of dispute, I will begin, in 
                                            
1 Due in large part to the groundbreaking work of Jane Friedman. See especially 
Friedman (2013) and (2017). For some interesting criticisms of some of Friedman’s 
work, see Archer (2018) and Archer (forthcoming).  
 
2 If there are no true epistemic principles that govern suspensions, then the correct 
theory of justified suspension might be a particularist one. My working assumption is 
that the epistemic status of particular suspensions is governed by general principles. 
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Section 1, by reviewing the main contending views about the nature of suspension. 
Rather than trying to decide among these views (something that would require a very 
different, and much longer, essay), I will proceed in a theory-neutral manner and look 
at how each of the contending views about the nature of suspension fits with various 
suspension principles. In Section 2, I step back and offer a taxonomy of the kinds of 
principles that might govern justified suspensions. Within that taxonomy, I locate what 
I will be calling suspension-to-suspension principles. These principles are modeled on the 
familiar Closure, Transmission, and Counter-Closure principles that are sometimes 
thought to govern justified belief. In Section 3, I say why these principles are especially 
important for the theory of justified suspension. In Section 4, I determine how each of 
these principles fares on the theories identified in Section 1. Then in Section 5, I draw 
some lessons.  
 
1. VIEWS ABOUT THE NATURE OF SUSPENSION 
Both of my main questions concern the normative nature of suspension. To answer 
these questions, though, we may first have to identify suspension’s non-normative 
nature. So I will begin by briefly stating the main competing views about the non-
normative nature of suspension. 3  I am interested here in views with ontological 
                                            
3  Epistemologists almost invariably theorize about the normative nature of belief 
without first taking a view about the ontology of belief. Below I provide reason to think 
that this same way of proceeding is not suitable for theorizing about the normative 
nature of suspension.  
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ambitions – views, that is, that try to capture what suspensions are identical to, and not 
views which state merely necessary and sufficient conditions on someone’s suspending 
judgment. With this in mind, here are the views4:  
 
The Sharp Credence View: to suspend about p is to equally divide one’s credence 
between p and not-p by having a 0.5 credence that p and a 0.5 credence that not-
p.5	 
 
The Maximally Mushy Credence View: to suspend about p is to be in a maximally 
mushy credence state regarding p, where this state is spread out across the full 
0-1 interval.6 
 
                                            
4 I omit the view, now widely dismissed, which says that suspending regarding p is 
identical to not believing p and not believing not-p. This view has several problems, 
among them that we do not suspend about propositions that we never entertain. More 
generally, in offering these four candidate views of the nature of suspension, I assume 
that suspending is an attitude of some kind; for a defense of this assumption, see 
Friedman (2013a).  
 
5 The Sharp Credence View is an example of a middling sharp credence view, where views 
of this kind say that to suspend about p is to equally, or to approximately, divide one’s 
credence between p and not-p by (i) having a 0.5, or close to 0.5, credence that p; and (ii) 
having a 0.5, or close to 0.5, credence that not-p. The points that I go on to make about 
The Sharp Credence View also apply to other middling credence views. For detailed 
discussion and criticism of middling sharp credence views, see Friedman (2013b).  
 
6 For discussion and development of this view, see Sturgeon (2010). I borrow the term 
“mushy credence” from White (2010). 
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Higher-Order Belief Views: to suspend about p is to have some distinctively 
epistemic higher-order belief – for example, the belief that one is neither 
justified in believing p nor justified in disbelieving p.7  
 
The Inquiry View: to suspend about p is to inquire into whether or not p is true.8	  
 
Though much can be said in favor of, and against, each of these views about 
suspension’s non-normative nature, my main concern will be with the epistemic norms 
that govern suspensions. Consequently, I am going to remain as neutral as possible 
about the (non-normative) nature of suspension.9 Still there are obvious connections 
between views about the (non-normative) nature of suspension and theories of justified 
suspension. After all, it seems that Proponents of The Sharp Credence View must take 
the epistemology of sharp credences as providing the correct theory of justified 
suspension; that proponents of The Maximally Mushy Credence View must take the 
epistemology of mushy credences as providing the correct theory of justified 
                                            
7 For discussion and development of this view, see Raleigh (forthcoming); Rosenkranz 
(2007) is also relevant.  
 
8 See Friedman (2017), though Friedman is primarily interested in defending the view 
that suspension and inquiry are biconditionally related, and not the stronger view that 
they are identical. 
 
9 If all four of the views I have outlined are mistaken, and some fifth view is correct, I 
hope to have at least uncovered a few things about the epistemology of the attitudes 
isolated in these four views. Of course, if one of those four views is correct, we will 
have learned about three other important kinds of attitudes as well.  
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suspension; that proponents of Higher-Order Belief Views must take the theory of 
justified belief as providing the correct theory of justified suspension; and that 
proponents of The Inquiry View must take the epistemology of inquiry (which tells us 
when inquiring into some question is justified) as providing the correct theory of 
justified suspension. In the face of these diverse views about the nature and norms of 
suspension, I will remain neutral and try to argue from inductions across these four 
views about the nature of suspension and their accompanying theories of justified 
suspension. This will allow us to determine where there is, and where there is not, 
unanimity about whether some suspension principle is true. As we will see, there is 
some impressive unanimity. Before getting to the supporting inductions though, we 
need to survey the general principles that might govern the justification of suspensions.    
 
2. A TAXONOMY OF CANDIDATE SUSPENSION PRINCIPLES 
My next task is to provide a taxonomy of the candidate principles that might 
govern whether some given suspension is justified. Note that I am after candidate 
principles. These are the principles that we need to consider when constructing a full 
theory of justified suspension. Though we will ultimately have to reject some of these 
principles, we need to begin by identifying and organizing all of the candidate 
suspension principles in a way that is helpful for understanding and evaluating those 
principles.  
 
2.1 STRONG AND WEAK SUSPENSION PRINCIPLES 
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The candidate principles divide into strong principles and weak principles. 
These two kinds of principles are closely connected to the two organizing questions 
that I mentioned at the outset. Recall that the first question was this: when, if ever, 
does one justified suspension confer justification on another suspension? Proposed 
answers to this question will cite strong principles. A strong principle is a generalization 
that tells us what confers justification on some justified suspensions. For example, a 
subset of strong principles consists in those principles that tell us when some justified 
suspensions confer justification on other suspensions. More generally though, any 
generalization which claims that some specified kind of fact confers justification on 
some specified suspensions counts as a strong principle. I refer to these as strong 
principles because they go beyond stating necessary or sufficient conditions for a 
suspension’s being justified, and identify what it is that confers justification on 
suspensions. The notion of conferring is crucial to a principle being a strong principle. 
This notion is meant to be an ecumenical one that can cover a variety of ideologies. So 
you can think of it in terms of what metaphysically grounds the justification of the 
relevant suspensions, or you can think of it in terms of what the truth-makers are for 
ascriptions of justified suspensions, or you can think of it in terms of what it is in-virtue 
of which those suspensions are justified, etc.  
Weak principles, by contrast, carry no implications about what confers 
justification on suspensions. Weak principles are less ambitious: they simply identify 
necessary, or sufficient, conditions for a suspension’s being justified. Still weak 
principles are important because they tell us how justified suspensions hang together. 
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This makes them crucial for determining the answer to my second organizing question. 
Recall that was this question: how do clusters of justified suspensions hang together? 
One justified suspension, as I will put it, hangs together with another suspension, as 
long as one necessitates, or suffices, for the other. However, since neither necessitating 
nor sufficing requires that one suspension confers justification on another suspension, 
these principles are logically weaker than strong principles. 
The distinction between strong and weak principles has some important 
implications. Since a strong principle might be false, but only because what it cites does 
not confer justification on suspensions, though what it cites does suffice for that 
suspension to be justified, strong principles have weak counterpart principles that cite 
a sufficient condition for the relevant suspension to be justified. A corollary of this is 
that a strong principle entails the corresponding weak principle that cites a sufficient 
condition on the justification of some suspensions, while that weak principle does not 
entail that strong principle. It also follows that weak principles that cite a necessary 
condition on the justification of some suspensions do not have strong principles as 
counterparts.10  
 
2.2 A TAXONOMY OF KINDS OF SUSPENSION PRINCIPLES 
To generate the candidate strong and weak principles that might govern justified 
suspensions, I am going to look to the familiar strong and weak principles that have 
                                            
10 This is because the satisfaction of a necessary condition on the truth of x is f does 
not entail that x is f – so it does not entail that anything confers f on x. 
Forthcoming in Belgrade Philosophical Annual                                       Page 9 of 30
 
   
 9 
been proposed for justified belief; I will transpose the taxonomy that I find there to 
arrive at a taxonomy of principles that might govern justified suspensions.  
In the arena of justified belief, strong principles can be distinguished by the 
kinds of items that are claimed to confer justification on some of our beliefs. Those 
candidate items are: 
1. other justified beliefs, 
2. other justified doxastic states of the subject (e.g. justified credences or 
justified suspensions), 
3. non-doxastic states of the subject (e.g. perceptual experiences), 
4. the reliability of the basic belief-forming process that produced the belief, 
5. the indispensable role that the belief plays in some inquiry (as proponents 
of justified belief in hinge propositions contend),  
6. a feature of the belief (or its context) that confers default justification on it, 
7. a combination of the previous items.  
Transposing this to the realm of justified suspensions yields candidate strong 
principles, which claim that the following items confer justification on some of our 
suspensions: 
1. other justified suspensions, 
2. other justified doxastic states of the subject (e.g. justified beliefs or justified 
credences), 
3. non-doxastic states of the subject (e.g. perceptual experiences), 
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4. some property of the basic suspension-forming process that produced the 
suspension, 
5. the indispensable role that the suspension plays in some inquiry,  
6. a feature of the suspension (or its context) that confers default justification, 
7. a combination of the previous items. 
This delivers the branch of the taxonomy that consists in the candidate strong 
principles. 
To complete the taxonomy, we need to add the candidate weak principles. 
Recall that some weak principles cite a necessary condition on the justification of some 
specified suspensions, and others cite a sufficient condition on the justification of some 
specified suspensions. Recruiting from the last list of seven items yields seven weak 
principles, each claiming that one kind of item suffices for some specified suspensions 
to be justified. The same can be done to yield principles which say of the respective 
items that they are necessary for some specified suspensions to be justified – this yields 
seven more principles.11 In total then we have fourteen kinds of weak principles to put 
alongside the seven kinds of strong principles that were identified in the previous 
paragraph. 
 
2.3 TWO KINDS OF SUSPENSION-TO-SUSPENSION PRINCIPLES 
                                            
11 For a useful discussion of some weak principles that connect beliefs to suspensions, 
see Rosa (forthcoming).  
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I am now going to narrow my focus to strong and weak principles that recruit 
the first kind of item on our list, namely other justified suspensions. I will call principles 
of this kind, suspension-to-suspension principles.12  My focus will be even narrower though. 
This is because suspension-to-suspension principles divide into two different subtypes. 
One subtype consists in principles that link two suspensions whose contents are 
logically related, while the other subtype consists in principles that link two suspensions 
whose contents are not logically related. My focus will be on the first subtype. 
Let me briefly illustrate the second subtype, before leaving principles belonging 
to that type behind. An example of a principle of the second subtype, where the 
contents are not logically related, is a principle that recruits a justified suspension about 
the reliability of one’s own epistemic faculties. A principle like this arguably plays a 
central role in the arguments of Descartes’s First Meditation. Here is an example of 
this kind of principle: if a person has a justified suspension about whether the beliefs 
that are produced by one of her faculties, f, are certain, then this confers justification 
on all of her suspensions that are produced by f.13 There is much to be said about 
                                            
12 Perhaps the two kinds of weak suspension-to-suspension principles (i.e. one kind 
that offers a justified suspension that is necessary for target suspension to be justified, 
and the other that offers a justified suspension that is sufficient for the same target 
suspension to be justified) can be collapsed into one kind. Though the two kinds of 
principles have the same form, the justified suspensions that are necessary for some 
target suspension to be justified could be very different from the justified suspensions 
that are sufficient for that same suspension to be justified.  
 
13 This principle allows that the recruited suspension confers justification on the target 
suspensions in a mediated way, by first operating as a justification defeater for the 
beliefs produced by the relevant faculty, which in turn confers justification on the 
suspensions produced by that faculty.  
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principles of this tupe. I mention them, and offer this example, though, only to illustrate 
that some suspension-to-suspension principles connect suspensions whose contents 
are not logically related. My focus in what remains will be on the other subtype, namely 
principles that connect suspensions whose contents are logically related to one another. 
I will call these content-connecting suspension principles. 
 
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTENT-CONNECTING PRINCIPLES 
Before examining some of the leading content-connecting principles, I want to 
highlight two reasons why content-connecting principles are especially important in the 
theory of justified suspension.  
One concerns implications for skepticism. Recall the construal of skepticism as 
covering views, which say, for some domain of claims, that the only justified stance 
that we can take to any of the claims in such a domain is one of suspension. With this 
in mind, notice this important point: if it turns out that there are suspension-to-
suspension principles of the content-connecting kind, then skepticism will be infectious. 
This is because if some claim is one for which suspension is the only justified stance, 
then the correct content-connecting principles will ensure that suspension is the only 
justified stance to take with respect to some other claim. In this way, justified 
suspension will spread. Of course, how justified suspension spreads in this way, from 
claim to claim, and the extent to which it does so, will depend on exactly which content-
connecting principles are correct and on what logical relations hold among the relevant 
claims. Still the basic point holds: suspension-to-suspension principles of the content-
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connecting kind can spread justified suspension, both through a domain, and perhaps 
also to other domains. 
 On the other hand, if no (or few) content-connecting principles are true, then 
the skeptic cannot argue from the fact that a subject is justified in suspending about 
one proposition to the claim that the subject is also justified in suspending about some 
logically related claim. The skeptic will have to find some other strategy to try to show 
that the subject is justified in suspending about the second claim, and this will require 
the skeptic to defend and deploy some other kind of suspension principle. 
 The second reason it is important to evaluate content-connecting, suspension-
to-suspension principles is that doing so will help to reveal the structure of justified 
suspension. Or, to use some of my earlier language, it will help us to see how justified 
suspensions hang together. To see this, return to the arena of justified belief. This time 
consider the debate between foundationalists, coherentists, infinitists, and skeptics over 
how our justified beliefs hang together. This debate is triggered by the familiar regress 
argument. That argument, recall, has, as a crucial premise, a belief-to-belief justification 
principle. This formulation of such a principle will serve our present purposes: if a 
belief is inferred from some other beliefs, then the inferred belief is justified only if the 
beliefs that it is inferred from are justified.14 A principle like this can be repeatedly 
applied to trigger a regress of justified belief. In turn, that regress forces us to choose 
                                            
14 To be defensible, this principle needs to be refined in several ways; such refinements 
do not, however, take away from my main point here. For some of the needed 
refinements, see Luzzi (2014). 
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one of four views. One, foundationalism, says that the regress terminates with justified 
beliefs that are not justified by other beliefs. A second, infinitism, says that the regress 
goes on ad infinitum. A third, coherentism, says that the best way to resolve the regress 
is to take justification to primarily attach to sets of beliefs, rather than individual beliefs. 
And a fourth, a form of skepticism, says that the best resolution is to conclude that 
there are no justified beliefs after all.  
If there is a parallel suspension-to-suspension principle that triggers a regress of 
justified suspensions, then we will have to choose one of four parallel views about how 
justified suspensions hang together. One, a foundationalist view, says that the regress 
of justified suspensions terminates with justified suspensions that are not justified by 
any other suspensions. A second, a form of infinitism, says that the regress of justified 
suspensions goes on ad infinitum. A third, coherentism about the structure of justified 
suspensions, says that the best way to resolve this regress is to take justification to 
primarily attach to sets of suspensions, rather than individual suspensions. And, a 
fourth is a form of skepticism, which says that the best resolution to this regress is to 
conclude that there are no justified suspensions after all.  
Alternatively, if it turns out that all of the suspension-to-suspension principles 
that could trigger a regress of justified suspensions are false, then we must look 
elsewhere to determine how justified suspensions hang together. Regardless, any 
adequate theory of justified suspension needs to tell us how justified suspensions hang 
together; or it needs to tell us why they don’t hang together in any interesting way. I 
will return to the structure of justified suspensions and the infectiousness of justified 
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suspension as I work through some specific content-connecting, suspension-to-
suspension principles.  
 
4. FIVE CONTENT-CONNECTING PRINCIPLES 
Let’s now examine some specific suspension-to-suspension principles of the content-
connecting kind. In this section, I will formulate and evaluate five principles of this 
kind. 
 
4.1 THE WEAK AND STRONG DUAL PRINCIPLES 
I begin with this very plausible principle:  
Weak Dual: If S’s suspension about p is justified, then S’s suspension 
about not-p is also justified.  
Notice that this is a weak principle since it does not say that the justified suspension 
about p is what confers justification on the suspension about not-p.  
This principle is very plausible; there is surely something normatively incoherent 
about suspending about p, while believing, or even disbelieving, not-p. Further support 
for Weak Dual comes when we consider how this principle comes out on the theories 
of justified suspension that naturally accompany the four views of suspension that were 
cataloged earlier. Consider then the main claims that are delivered by orthodox versions 
of the epistemologies that naturally go along with each of those views of suspension. 
First, on orthodox epistemologies of sharp credence, the relevant claim is highly 
plausible. It is this claim: if S’s 0.5 credence that p is justified, then S’s 0.5 credence that 
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not-p is also justified. Second, on one epistemology of mushy credence, the relevant 
claim is the following highly plausible claim: if S’s maximally mushy credence that p is 
justified, then S’s maximally mushy credence that not-p is also justified. Third, on a 
plausible epistemology of belief, the key claim that follows from the conjunction of 
Weak Dual and a sample Higher-Order Belief View is highly plausible, though its 
logical form is complex. It is this claim: if S has a justified higher-order belief that n 
(where n is: S is neither justified in believing p nor justified in believing not-p), then S’s 
higher-order belief that not-n is also justified (where not-n is: S neither justified in 
believing not-p nor justified in believing p) – in fact, these are arguably one and the same 
higher-order belief.15 And, last, on at least one plausible epistemology of inquiry, the 
key claim is also a highly plausible one. It is this claim: if S’s inquiry into whether p is 
true is a reasonable act of inquiry, then her inquiry into whether not-p is true is also a 
reasonable act of inquiry – in fact, these are arguably one and the same inquiry. Weak 
Dual, I conclude, enjoys strong support. 
What about Weak Dual’s strong counterpart? That is this principle: 
Strong Dual: If S’s suspension about p is justified, then this confers 
justification on S’s suspension about not-p.  
                                            
15 Notice that the only possible difference between these two beliefs lies in the order 
of the disjuncts in the negated disjunctions that are the contents of the respective 
higher-order beliefs. The logical form of the content of the first belief is ~(JBp v JB~p), 
and the logical form of the content of the second is ~(JB~p v JBp).  
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This principle is far less plausible. One problem it faces is a symmetry problem. It is 
highly plausible that the relation of conferring justification is asymmetric16; but there 
does not seem to be any epistemic asymmetry between suspensions about p and 
suspensions about not-p, which would give one of these the needed priority over the 
other, so that the one always confers justification on the other, but the second never 
confers justification on the first. There is more to be said here about Strong Dual, but 
this is a serious strike against it.  
Even if Strong Dual is true though, not much follows about either of the two 
issues highlighted in the previous section. The skeptic will not get far by using either 
Strong Dual or Weak Dual since these principles only allow justified suspension to 
spread from a person’s required stance regarding p to her stance regarding not-p. As for 
the structure of justified suspension, the most these principles imply is that justified 
suspensions about contradictory propositions will either both be justified or both be 
unjustified. This, however, tells us nothing about the structure of any other sets of 
justified suspensions besides those that are directed at contradictories. So neither dual 
principle can help us decide among the four structural options that were outlined 
                                            
16 Someone might resist the claim that conferring justification is an asymmetric relation 
by claiming that coherentist theories of justification provide us with models of beliefs 
that mutually confer justification on one another. Two points in response. First, 
plausible coherentist theories do not say that two beliefs in logically equivalent 
propositions can confer justification on one another – such a view would be much too 
permissive. Plus coherentists typically hold that much larger sets of beliefs need to be 
in place for there to be any justified beliefs. And, second, on the best formulations of 
coherentism, justification primarily attaches to groups of beliefs, not individual beliefs 
– so one individual belief never confers justification on another individual belief. 
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earlier. 17  However, the fact that justified suspensions are paired in this way is 
compatible with the view that either the justification enjoyed by the suspension about 
p or the justification enjoyed by the suspension about not-p has its justification conferred 
on it by something outside this pair of suspensions. And the operative principle that 
governs that conferring might be some other strong suspension-to-suspension 
principle; moreover, that principle might trigger a regress of justified suspensions. Let’s 
examine some principles that might do this.  
 
4.2 THE CLOSURE AND TRANSMISSION PRINCIPLES  
Next are some principles that are modeled on some familiar belief-to-belief 
principles. Two are counterparts of one another. The weak principle in the pair is 
modeled on the familiar idea that justified belief is closed under known entailment. We 
can work with this rendering of that idea, a single-premise closure principle, which says: 
                                            
17 There are other candidate suspension-to-suspension principles, besides Weak Dual 
and Strong Dual, that have no weighty consequences for skepticism’s prospects or for 
revealing the structure of justified suspensions because they can’t (even if true) spread 
justified suspension across claims in some significant way. Other examples include 
principles modelled on disjunction introduction (e.g. if S’s suspension about p is 
justified, then S’s suspension about p or q is justified), principles modelled on 
conjunction introduction (e.g. if S’s suspension about p is justified and S’s suspension 
about q is justified, then S’s suspension about p & q is justified), and principles modeled 
on reasoning across a known biconditional (e.g. that if S has a justified suspension 
about p, and S knows that p iff q, then S’s suspension about q is also justified). Notice 
that the claim that these principles do not carry weighty consequences for skepticism 
or for the structure of justified suspensions is about what these principles imply; it is 
not a claim about whether they are true. See Rosa (forthcoming) for arguments against 
simple versions of these principles.  
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Closure for Belief: If (i) S’s belief that p is justified, (ii) S competently 
deduces q from p, and (iii) S thereby comes to believe q while retaining 
her justified belief that p throughout, then S’s belief that q is justified.18 
Here is the parallel principle for suspension: 
Closure for Suspension: If (i) S’s suspension about p is justified, (ii) S 
competently deduces q from p, and (iii) S thereby comes to suspend 
about q while retaining her justified suspension about p throughout, then 
S’s suspension about q is justified.  
To see the strong counterparts of these principle, return to belief. There Closure for 
Belief has as its strong counterpart the so-called “transmission principle”, which adds 
to Closure for Belief the claim that it also follows from the antecedent of Closure for 
Belief that it is the satisfaction of (i)-(iii) that confers justification on S’s belief that q. 
Here is a version of that principle: 
Transmission for Belief: If (i) S’s belief that p is justified, (ii) S 
competently deduces q from p, and (iii) S thereby comes to believe q 
while retaining her justified belief that p throughout, then (i)-(iii) confer 
justification on S’s belief that q. 
And here is the parallel principle for suspension: 
                                            
18 Read ‘competently deduces’ as a success term that implies knowledge; so S competently 
deduces q from p entails that S knows that p entails q. My formulation here is closely modeled 
on Hawthorne’s Single-Premise Closure principle for knowledge in his (2004).  
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Transmission for Suspension: If (i) S’s suspension about p is justified, 
(ii) S competently deduces q from p, and (iii) S thereby comes to suspend 
about q while retaining her justified suspension about p throughout, then 
(i)-(iii) confer justification on S’s suspension about q. 
Because Transmission for Suspension is stronger than Closure for Suspension, if 
Closure for Suspension is false, then Transmission for Suspension is also false. I will 
now argue that Closure for Suspension is false. 
Consider a coin that is about to be flipped, and a subject who has a justified 
suspension about whether the coin will land heads. Suppose that our subject knows 
that the coin will land heads entails propositions like coins exist, coins will be flipped, and coins 
either land heads or tails. Suppose also that she competently reasons from the claim that 
the coin will land heads to one of these last claims, and that while doing so she retains 
her suspension about whether the coin will land heads. Closure for Suspension implies 
that she is justified in suspending about coins exist, coins will be flipped, and coins land either 
heads or tails. But this is clearly false.  
The implausibility of Closure for Suspension is obvious when the point is put 
in terms of sufficient conditions. Here it is helpful to think in terms of a sufficient 
condition, s, on the truth of a proposition, p. Thought of in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions, Closure for Suspension says that if someone has a justified 
suspension about whether some sufficient condition, s, for the truth of p has been 
satisfied, then she is justified in suspending about p. This is clearly false though. Having 
this kind of justified suspension does not preclude a subject from having a justified 
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belief (or knowledge) that another sufficient condition for p is met. Since the latter will 
put her in an excellent position to have a justified belief that p (or even to know p), it 
precludes her from being justified in suspending about p.19 
This is confirmed when we run this last point through the four views of 
suspension. First, The Sharp Credence View allows that one can have a justified 0.5 
credence that s, and yet not be justified in having a 0.5 credence that p, all while knowing 
that s entails p. This will happen when one has a sufficiently high justified credence that 
some other sufficient condition on the truth of p is satisfied. Similarly, The Maximally 
Mushy Credence View allows that one can have a justified maximally mushy credence 
about s, yet not be justified in having a maximally mushy credence about p, all while 
knowing that s entails p. This will happen when one has a sufficiently high justified 
credence that some other sufficient condition on the truth of p is satisfied. The same 
is true on Higher-Order Belief Views. Here one can have a (higher-order) justified 
belief that one is neither justified in believing, nor justified in disbelieving, s, yet not be 
justified in believing (at the higher-order) that one is neither justified in believing p nor 
justified in disbelieving p, again all while knowing that s entails p. This will happen when 
one is justified in believing that some other sufficient condition on p is satisfied. And, 
last, The Inquiry View of suspended judgment allows that it can be reasonable for one 
to inquire into whether s is true, yet it not be reasonable for one to inquire into whether 
p is true, again, while also knowing that s entails p. All three of these things are true when 
                                            
19 Here, and elsewhere, I assume the following weak uniqueness principle: if S is 
justified in believing p, then S is not justified in suspending about p. 
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one knows that some other sufficient condition on the truth of p is satisfied. This last 
piece of knowledge makes it unreasonable to inquire into whether p is true or false.20 
This review of the four leading views of the nature of suspension provides additional 
support against Closure for Suspension.  
 
4.3 EXCURSUS: CAN SUSPENSIONS FIGURE INTO INFERENTIAL REASONING? 
It is worth pausing at this point to consider an important issue that bears on 
Closure for Suspension, Transmission for Suspension, and another principle that I will 
soon examine. The issue concerns a potentially problematic assumption that might 
underlie these principles. The concern is that these principles assume that suspensions 
can figure into inferential reasoning, as beliefs do. But it is far from clear what is 
involved in, say, reasoning and inferring to a conclusion, about which one suspends 
judgment.   
The issue of whether suspensions can figure into inferential reasoning is 
important and underexplored. But it is an issue that can only be adequately answered 
with a much different, and longer, paper. More importantly, since it concerns the non-
normative nature of suspensions, rather than the normative nature of suspensions, I 
am going to set it aside. Still, two points are worth keeping in mind. The first is that it 
is not clear that Closure for Suspension and Transmission for Suspension really do 
require that suspensions figure into inferential reasoning. There are two reasons for 
                                            
20 For defense of this claim, see Friedman (2017). 
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this. One is that competently deducing q from p does not require either suspending about q 
or suspending about p – keep in mind that it is propositions, not attitudes towards 
propositions, that are deduced from one another. Second, thereby coming to suspend about 
q can occur as the last in a series of mental states without that series constituting an 
episode of inferential reasoning. In fact, suspensions might show up as both the first 
and last items in such a series and yet that series not be an episode of inferential 
reasoning.  This is so with belief: a series of mental states can begin with one belief and 
end with another belief, and yet that series not constitute an episode of inferential 
reasoning. For example, on some models of higher-order belief, a person can begin 
with the belief that grass is green, then go into some self-monitoring mental states, and 
then form the higher-order belief that she believes that grass is green – and yet no 
inferential reasoning needs to have occurred during this time.21 Similarly, suspensions 
might figure into a series of mental states, perhaps one that also includes deducing one 
proposition from another, even if that series does not constitute an episode of 
inferential reasoning. 
Second, it is worth going back over the views about the nature of suspension 
canvassed in Section 1, and asking whether they allow for suspensions to figure into 
inferential reasoning. When we do this, we find that on Higher-Order Belief Views, 
there is no problem with suspensions figuring into inferential reasoning, since 
suspensions are themselves just beliefs (and surely beliefs can figure into inferential 
                                            
21 In such cases one belief is non-inferentially based on another belief.  
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reasoning). As for The Sharp Credence View and The Maximally Mushy Credence 
View, we can at least say that proponents of these views should be motivated to model 
suspensions so that they can figure into inferential reasoning since this is just an 
instance of the more general ambition of modelling credences so that they can figure 
into inferential reasoning. It would be a serious cost to theorizing with degrees of belief 
(whether sharp or mushy), if degrees of belief cannot figure into our inferential 
reasoning.22 Things are admittedly different with The Inquiry View. Here it seems 
much less obvious that suspensions can figure into inferential reasoning, since, 
according to this view, suspensions are directed at questions, not propositions. There 
might however be some non-obvious way to show that questions can figure into 
inferential reasoning. 
Let’s return to the normative nature of suspensions and look at one last content-
connecting suspension-to-suspension principle.      
 
4.4 THE COUNTER-CLOSURE PRINCIPLE 
 The last point I argued for before the excursus concerned justified suspensions 
about known sufficient conditions. The point was this: having a justified suspension 
about some sufficient condition for the truth of a proposition does not entail being 
justified in suspending about that proposition. This is because one can have a justified 
belief (or know) that some other sufficient condition on the truth of that proposition 
                                            
22 For a partial defense of the view that credences can figure into inferential reasoning, 
see Staffel (2013). 
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is satisfied – when this is so, one is justified in believing that proposition, and one is 
not justified in suspending about it. 
What about having a justified suspension about whether a necessary condition on 
the truth of a proposition is met? This is equivalent to the question of whether a 
principle that I will call Counter-Closure for Suspension is true. To see what this principle 
is, consider first this version of the Counter-Closure principle for justified belief: 
Counter-Closure for Belief: If (i) S has a justified belief that q (ii) that 
is solely based on a competent inference from p to q, and (iii) S believes 
that p, then S’s belief that p is justified.23 
Here is the parallel principle for suspension: 
Counter-Closure for Suspension: If S has a justified suspension about 
q, (ii) S competently infers q from p, and (iii) S suspends about p, then 
S’s suspension about p is justified.24  
This principle is a weak one since it does not say that the justified suspension about q 
confers justification on the suspension about p.  
Counter-Closure for Suspension is the best candidate for a principle that can 
trigger a regress of justified suspensions. For, if this principle is true, then each 
                                            
23  This formulation is fine for present purposes. Again, for some of the needed 
refinements, see Luzzi (2014). 
 
24 Notice that no reference is made in this principle to any inferential reasoning that 
involves a transition from one suspension to another suspension, and thus reflects the 
thought from the last section that perhaps no inferential reasoning needs to figure into 
any content-connecting suspension-to-suspension principles.  
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proposition that is known to entail a proposition about which one is justified in 
suspending will itself be a proposition about which one is justified in suspending. 
Counter-Closure for Suspension could then iterate, and thereby spread justified 
suspension further back through entailing propositions, thus way triggering a regress 
of justified suspensions. Of course, if Counter-Closure for Suspension is false, then it 
won’t trigger any such regress and will therefore not shed any light on the structure of 
justified suspensions. 
Initially Counter-Closure for Suspension might seem plausible. For example, I 
know that a necessary condition on a coin having landed heads is that the coin was 
flipped. But if I have a justified suspension about whether the coin was flipped, then 
surely I am also justified in suspending about whether it landed heads. Despite this, 
however, the principle is false. The reason is simple: in addition to having a justified 
suspension about whether a necessary condition for p is met, one might have a justified 
belief (or knowledge) that some other necessary condition for p is not met. When this 
happens, one is not justified in suspending about p – instead one is justified in believing 
that p is false.  
This too is confirmed by each of the four views of suspension. Here, in 
somewhat compressed form, are the crucial points. First, The Sharp Credence View 
allows that one can have a justified 0.5 credence that n, a justified 0.5 credence that not-
n, know that p entails n, and yet not be justified in having a 0.5 credence that p. All of 
this will be true if one has a sufficiently high justified credence that some other 
necessary condition on the truth of p is not satisfied. Similarly, The Maximally Mushy 
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Credence View allows that one can have a justified maximally mushy credence that n, 
know that p entails n, yet not be justified in having a maximally mushy credence that p. 
This will happen when one has a sufficiently high justified credence that some other 
necessary condition on the truth of p is not met. The same pattern holds on Higher-
Order Belief Views. One can have a higher-order justified belief that one is neither 
justified in believing, nor justified in disbelieving, n, know that p entails n, and yet not 
be justified in having a higher-order belief that one is neither justified in believing, nor 
justified in disbelieving, p. Once again this will happen when one is justified in believing 
that some other necessary condition on p is not satisfied. Last is The Inquiry View. 
This view allows for cases in which it is reasonable for one to inquire into whether n is 
true, when one knows that p entails q, and yet it is unreasonable for one to inquire into 
whether p is true. All of this will hold when one knows that some other necessary 
condition on the truth of p is not satisfied. This last piece of knowledge makes it 
unreasonable to inquire into whether p is true or false. This induction across the four 
views is more support for rejecting Counter-Closure for Suspension. 
 
5. LESSONS  
 Where does all of this leave us? In particular, what lessons can we now draw 
about the skeptic’s prospects and about the structure of justified suspensions? 
 Take the skeptic’s prospects first. Since we have, at the very most, only 
identified two suspension-to-suspension principles that are true (namely Weak Dual 
and Strong Dual), and since those two principles can do very little to spread justified 
Forthcoming in Belgrade Philosophical Annual                                       Page 28 of 30
 
   
 28 
suspension across a body of claims, the skeptic’s prospects look a little dimmer. 
Principles like Closure for Suspension, Transmission for Suspension, or Counter-
Closure are not available to show that justified suspension is infectious, since those 
three principles are false.  
 What about the structure of justified suspension? Based on the finding that 
Counter-Closure for Suspension is false, we can at least say this much: a regress of 
justified suspensions is not triggered in the same way that a regress of justified beliefs 
is typically thought to be triggered. Since it is unclear how else a regress of justified 
suspensions could be triggered, it remains unclear how justified suspensions might 
hang together. Much more work needs to be done to reveal the structure of justified 
suspensions.25  
I end with a third lesson. It is based on the kinds of considerations and the 
cogency of the considerations that I offered against Closure for Suspension, 
Transmission for Suspension, and Counter-Closure for Suspension. Those 
considerations, both in kind and in cogency, are very different from the familiar 
considerations that are offered against the parallel principles for justified belief. 
Epistemologists on both sides of the debates about Closure for Belief, Transmission 
for Belief, and Counter-Closure for Belief will, I think, agree that there are no simple, 
highly cogent considerations about the epistemology of necessary and sufficient 
                                            
25 Perhaps because the approach that borrows from the theory of justified belief has 
not yielded anything, an entirely different approach is needed to reveal the structure 
of justified suspension. 
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conditions that can be offered against any of these three principles. Debates about 
those principles continue because there are no simple highly cogent arguments on 
either side of the debate. As we have seen though things are quite different for the 
parallel principles governing suspension: each of those principles has been definitively 
shown to be false, both on general grounds about the epistemology of necessary and 
sufficient conditions, and on the basis of the inductions across the four leading views 
about the nature of suspension. The difference in both the kinds and cogency of the 
considerations that bear on the parallel principles in the realms of suspension and belief 
is some reason to think that theorizing about justified suspension can unfold very 
differently from how theorizing about justified belief unfolds. This, I submit, gives us 
even more reason to continue to theorize about justified suspended judgment.  
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